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Wage adjustments for employees are a reactive mechanism to changing market conditions and form 
a significant part of pay policy. Though various attempts to explore wage levels and wage differentials 
have been made, wage adjustment policies remain an understudied topic. This paper analyses the 
determinants of wage adjustments based on data from Russian companies between 2015 and 2017. 
The analysis is based on detailed data from an employer survey covering more than 5 000 firms in 
both the public and private sectors. The study adopts probit models to identify the reasons for wage 
revisions, which depend on both internal employer characteristics and external labour market conditions. 
The results are in line with previous research on the topic and suggest that both internal and external 
factors influence wage adjustments. A wage adjustment is a reflection of an ability to pay, meaning 
that revisions are often made by successful firms with high employee turnover. It was also found that 
institutional frameworks, especially trade union activity, also affect a firm’s decision to adjust wages, 
despite the widely-held belief that unions play an insignificant role in Russia. This study contributes 
to the limited literature by analyzing the determinants of wage policies depending on a firm’s 
characteristics and is the first study of its kind based on extensive Russian data.
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Wages are a key indicator of the labour mar-
ket and a significant factor in employment 
relations. Set by the employer, wages instant-
ly reflect the inner value of the employee’s 
human capital and other personal character-
istics. However, the process of wage setting 
is not always that obvious as the character-
istics of a firm are a widely recognized as a 
reason for behaviour related differences (see 
[Suleman et al., 2013; Sgobbi, 2015], among 
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labour market conditions differ significantly 
from those in Russia, both in content and in 
context. Although there are academic papers 
dedicated to the wage determination process 
in Russian companies where data from a 
single enterprise is considered [Morrison, 
Swartz, 2003; Dohmen, Lehmann, Schaffer, 
2007], we provide an analysis based on a large 
sample of enterprises functioning in current 
market conditions. Due to strict formal labour 
regulations and relatively high firing costs, 
Russian enterprises have a fast adjustment 
mechanism expressed primarily in wages. 
Wages are split into two tiers: base pay and 
variable pay. Variable pay in Russia is rela-
tively large compared to developed countries 
and could be as high as 30% of overall remu-
neration [Gimpelson, Kapelushnikov, 2013].
While base pay is specified in the contract 
and can be regulated with collective agree-
ments, variable pay almost entirely depends 
on the employer’s decision and, accordingly, 
the total compensation depends on the per-
formance of the business. Cutting variable 
pay allows some flexibility even though the 
conditions of the external labour market may 
remain inflexible. Adjusting variable pay is 
the most common response to short-term 
change, while adjusting base pay is the re-
sponse to long-term. Evidence suggests that 
nearly two-thirds of Russian firms adjust 
base pay with some frequency.
Therefore, the research question of this 
paper is the following: what mechanisms force 
enterprises to revise the base pay? Our find-
ings suggest that the wage adjustment mech-
anism of Russian enterprises is more complex 
than generally assumed. 
This paper investigates the wage policies 
of Russian firms in terms of wage adjustments 
according to the characteristics of the em-
ployer. The study contributes to the existing 
literature in two main ways. First, our anal-
ysis concerns base pay while the majority of 
studies in the Russian labour market focus 
on variable pay [Commander, Dhar, Yemtsov, 
1996]. As in previous research, we focus 
mostly on the adjustments that are system-
atically performed for individuals and for 
others). A firm’s decision to adjust wages ap-
pears to be affected by a variety of internal 
and external factors, including the institu-
tional framework of the particular labour 
market, current macroeconomic conditions, 
and the financial state of the company.
At this stage, we should clarify what we 
mean by wage adjustments in this paper. A 
wage adjustment is either an increase or a 
decrease in the nominal base pay for an em-
ployee. A raise in performance pay does not 
count as an adjustment. Due to structural 
differences between companies, the necessity 
to adjust wages according to market changes 
can be viewed in numerous ways. Moreover, 
enterprises prefer to avoid revisions if market 
conditions remain constant as wage reconsid-
erations have high transaction costs, includ-
ing management time and additional spending 
on research. 
The literature either focuses on HR prac-
tices and their impact on employee perfor-
mance and well-being [Wang, Seifert, 2017] 
or investigates wage adjustments in the con-
text of downward nominal wage rigidity 
[Blanchflower, Oswald, 1988; Bewely, 1999; 
Babecký et al., 2010]. There are a number of 
studies concerning the wage behaviour of 
firms from the macroeconomic point of view, 
as the problem of wage-setting is closely linked 
to unemployment, inflation and other macro-
economic issues. One of the most notable stud-
ies in terms of country coverage was done by 
the European Central Bank and the National 
Central Banks in the framework of Wage 
Dynamics Network [Cornille, 2015; Babecký 
et al., 2010; Kézdi, Kónya, 2011]. The survey-
based research examined the reaction of firms 
to economic shocks and elicited the wage set-
ting practices used in European countries. 
However, there is very limited literature 
dedicated to the internal factors determining 
wage adjustments and the institutions which 
shape wage behaviour [Bayo-Moriones, Galdón-
Sánchez, Martinez-de-Morentin, 2016; Forth, 
Millward, 2000; Ingram, Wadsworth, Brown, 
1999]. 
Most of the literature is based on data 
obtained from European countries where 
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groups of employees, which is sometimes 
referred to in the literature as pay settlements 
[Bayo-Moriones, Galdón-Sánchez, Martinez-
de-Morentin, 2016; Ingram, Wadsworth, 
Brown, 1999]. Second, although the link be-
tween wage differentials and employer char-
acteristics has been widely assessed by schol-
ars [Werner, Ward, 2004], wage adjustment 
behaviour does not necessarily follow the 
same patterns. 
The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 1 begins by reviewing the lit-
erature on wage adjustment and describes 
the features of the Russian labour market. 
Section 2 presents the data used for the study 
and explains the research methodology. 
Section 3 provides the results of the regres-
sion analysis and a discussion of the deter-
minants of various wage adjustment policies. 
The last section offers a conclusion.
1. LITERATURE REvIEW
The first empirical works concerning the wage 
policies of firms can be traced back to the 
1980s [Knight, Sabot, 1983]. Though human 
capital was perceived to be the main factor 
behind wage differentials, attempts to dis-
tinguish the effect of employer characteristics 
on wages were already being made in early 
literature (see [Groshen, 1991]). More recent 
empirical studies concerning wage policies 
started re-appearing again in the 2000s, 
mostly as a result of the world financial cri-
sis of 2008 which, in addition to major layoffs, 
lead to real and nominal wage cuts in a num-
ber of countries. In particular, a great deal 
of attention was paid to wage adjustments as 
one of the core mechanisms to react to eco-
nomic challenges. As labour costs form a 
significant part of the overall costs of any 
enterprise, by adjusting them in a timely 
manner, firms are able to become competitive 
and financially successful. 
However, companies usually avoid wage 
cuts even during severe economic shocks. 
This phenomenon has come to be known as 
downward nominal wage rigidity. Pay cuts 
are assumed to be undesirable as they could 
damage worker morale and the reputation of 
the firm, which could lead directly to difficul-
ties when hiring new employees [Bewley, 1999; 
Kunovac, Pufnik, 2015]. In fact, wages are 
considered to play a motivational role for 
employees. Many studies have used interviews 
with managers in order to investigate their 
attitudes towards wage adjustments, includ-
ing pay reductions. The results mainly re-
vealed that fairness considerations are a core 
motivation in the labour market, hence, rel-
ative wages are important for wage adjustment 
decisions [Blinder, Choi, 1990; Blanchflower, 
Oswald, 1988; Agell, Bennmarker, 1995; Agell, 
Bennmarker, 2007]. In the majority of cases, 
a pay cut policy does not really pay-off: a cut 
may save a few jobs but that is not equal to 
the advantages of the layoffs [Bewley, 2007]. 
Thus, wages are rarely revised downwards. 
Also, sometimes wages do not react to tem-
poral shocks as the firm’s adjustment to new 
market conditions occurs through non-labour 
expense cuts [Kézdi, Kónya, 2012].
Wage adjustments may occur for various 
internal and external reasons [Blanchflower, 
Oswald, 1988]. In this paper, we assume that 
employer characteristics and the institution-
al framework determine the reaction of firms 
to any internal or external factors. We also 
pay attention to inflation as one external 
reason for wage adjustments.
1.1. Employer characteristics
A great deal of the literature is dedicated to 
the characteristics that result in higher wag-
es. Although this is not necessarily the same 
as frequent wage adjustments, in wage adjust-
ment decisions several similar mechanisms 
and explanations can be applied. It has been 
widely acknowledged that the reward system 
adopted by an employer varies due to the in-
ner workings of the firm (see [Groshen, 1991]). 
In particular, productivity and financial suc-
cess provide the employer with the ability 
to pay [Blanchflower, Oswald, 1988; Agel, 
Lundborg, 1995]. Generating greater income 
allows the firm to allocate resources with 
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relatively more freedom which, in general, 
can result both in a performance pay increase 
or a base pay increase. For non-union private 
firms, the market wage rate and the firm’s 
profitability are the most important factors 
in wage adjustment decisions [Amirault, 
Fenton, Laflèche, 2013]. Characteristics such 
as investment and innovation activity which 
can be expressed either by the implementation 
of new managerial practices or technological 
tools may increase the firm’s productivity 
and consequently their profits.
Some studies are dedicated to the link be-
tween the size of the establishment and its 
wage policy as large firms usually pay higher 
wages and offer wage posting to new employ-
ees meaning that the wage is defined in terms 
of duties and the employee’s characteristics 
do not affect it [Brown, Medoff, 1989; Belfield, 
Wei, 2004]. The standardization of usual prac-
tices leads to wage increases and a fall in 
transaction costs. Larger companies are pre-
sumed to be more sensitive to work disruptions, 
hence, the bargaining power of employees may 
be greater in larger companies in order to 
minimize the risk of strikes and other actions 
[Agell, Bennmarker, 2007]. In contrast, start-
ups and small firms pay lower wages [Brixy, 
Kohaut, Schabel, 2007]. 
Previous research has revealed the impor-
tance of the ownership of the firm. International 
corporations tend to operate under different 
institutional conditions, and thus their pay 
policies reflect these differences. A smaller 
correlation between wages and the perfor-
mance of the firm may be observed due to 
the broad geographical spread of the countries 
where they operate [Bayo-Moriones, Galdón-
Sánchez, Martinez-de-Morentin, 2016]. Some 
scholars analyzing transition economies dis-
covered that firm ownership does not have 
a systematic effect on employment and wag-
es, contrary to expectations [Basu, Estrin, 
Svejnar, 2000].
1.2. Institutional framework
The correlation between institutions and la-
bour market outcomes has been assessed in 
literature [Lehmann, Muravyev, 2012]. The 
institutional framework plays an especially 
notable role in wage flexibility as it predeter-
mines reactions when enterprises experience 
economic challenges (see [Ingram, Wadsworth, 
Brown, 1999]). Unions and collective agree-
ments are institutional adjustment mecha-
nisms which determine the possibility of wage 
bargaining and market rates. Strict institu-
tional regulation is associated with the prev-
alence of external factors in the wage-setting 
process, while weak institutional regulation, 
in contrast, result in the predominance of 
internal factors [Bayo-Moriones, Galdón-
Sánchez, Martinez-de-Morentin, 2016]. 
Trade unions, as an essential part of the 
institutional framework, experienced a de-
crease in power in the majority of developed 
economies at the turn of the century. Still, 
unions exercise workplace strength in wage 
determination in spite of the efforts taken to 
reform the system and deregulate labour 
markets, which is assumed to improve their 
performance [Lehmann, Muraviev, 2012]. 
Enterprises are supposed to change their 
wage adjustment patterns when there is de-
regulation, by switching their emphasis from 
external factors to internal. However, a study 
in Britain shows that this switch never oc-
curred as inflation and comparability remained 
important [Ingram, Wadsworth, Brown, 1999]. 
Another important instrument is the na-
tional legal minimum wage. The minimum 
wage acts as the floor for the wage adjustment 
process. A low minimum wage leads to an 
increase in low-paid jobs. Despite the common 
agreement on productivity as the main factor 
influencing wages, the minimum wage to-
gether with other external factors may act 
as the main driver of wage increases [Agudelo, 
Sala, 2016].
Wages are also the result of collective 
bargaining, which depends on the distribution 
of bargaining powers between the employer 
and the employees of a particular enterprise. 
However, in countries with rigid institutions 
wage adjustment does not completely depend 
on the firm’s decisions but on decisions tak-
en jointly at industry and national levels. 
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Empirical studies show that in a post-crisis 
environment, companies functioning in more 
centralized bargaining regimes have higher 
wages compared to those in a more decentral-
ized setting [Ronchi, di Mauro, 2017]. 
1.3. Russian labour market specifics
The Russian labour market has features setting 
it apart from many developed countries. As 
discussed earlier, in developed economies em-
ployers are usually hesitant to cut wages, and 
instead adjust labour costs by reducing the 
number of employees. The situation in Russia 
is different both in content and context. The 
institutional framework of the Russian labour 
market consists of institutions which regulate 
the quantitative adjustment of labour, and 
institutions which enable wage flexibility. Rigid 
labour legislation impedes employment volatil-
ity, while two-tier wages, which includes a 
significant variable portion linked to the results 
of the economic activity of the establishment, 
ensure labour cost adjustments [Commander, 
Dhar, Yemtsov, 1996; Gimpelson, Kapelushnikov, 
2013]. Flexibility in terms of adjusting to cri-
ses is underscored by high wage elasticity to 
employment [Vakulenko, Gurvich, 2016]. The 
modern Russian model of the labour market, 
which first appeared during the transition 
period in the 1990s, proved to be valid during 
the 2008–2009 recession, when a significant 
proportion of private enterprises introduced 
cuts and freezes in nominal wages [Gimpelson, 
Kapelushnikov, 2013].
Russia has a complex bargaining structure, 
which includes national-level agreements, 
industry-level tariff agreements between em-
ployers’ associations and sector-specific trade 
unions, and regional-level agreements. As 
variable pay is not enshrined in the contract, 
it is not subject to collective bargaining 
[Gimpelson, Kapelushnikov, 2013]. In contrast 
with many developed countries, trade unions 
and collective agreement regulation, although 
present, are assumed to have an insignificant 
influence on the wage setting process with 
trade unions being controlled by the govern-
ment [Lehmann, Muraviev, 2012]. Wages are 
usually set through informal individual bargain-
ing without union participation [Lukiyanova, 
2011]. However, collective agreements are 
intended to set the minimum wage level, with 
no institutional mechanisms for possible wage 
increases being recognized. Until recently, 
in Russia the minimum wage was determined 
nationally. Regional differentiation was al-
lowed by a system of regional coefficients. 
However, de to substantial regional hetero-
geneity, most of the regional labour markets 
remained insensitive to this institution. After 
reforms were passed in 2016, a brand new 
system was implemented, which now combines 
federal- and regional-level participation. 
Although the legislative change lead to an 
increase in the earnings of low-paid workers, 
it did not result in greater variation in min-
imum wages. A relatively small proportion 
of Russian employees are exposed to minimum 
wage changes [Lukiyanova, Vishnevskaya, 
2016].
A large part of the literature is dedicated 
to the transformation period in Russia in the 
1990s and demonstrates how wage setting 
behaviour varied with the change of the eco-
nomic system and the legal status of enter-
prises [Basu, Estrin, Svejnar, 2000]. At the 
beginning of the transition period, Russian 
firms were unresponsive in adjusting their 
employment to changes while other Eastern 
European countries, which were also subject 
to communist regimes in the past, started 
doing this faster. As a result of these shifts 
in the economic structure, brand new employ-
er-employee relations appeared as firms ac-
quired almost complete freedom in their wage 
setting and employment policies. 
2. METhoD
2.1. Data and sample
For the research, the Interaction of Internal 
and External Labour Markets survey (IIELM) 
is used, which is carried out annually by the 
National Research University Higher School 
of Economics and contains information on 
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HRM techniques. The sample consists of 5,058 
enterprises from 25 regions in both the pub-
lic and private sector and covers their ac-
tivities from 2015 to 2017. The survey provides 
detailed information on aspects of their eco-
nomic performance, including financial posi-
tion, wage revision policies and workforce. 
The non-panel sample is adjusted annually. 
The data was not intended to provide a pan-
el, with only approximately 5% of the whole 
sample being panel data. Therefore, we employ 
pooled data and control for the year of obser-
vation in the analysis.
Enterprises differ in sectoral perspective 
as differences in business processes lead to 
different types of workers being in demand. 
The core segment of the economy which many 
researchers focus on is manufacturing — an 
old sector with developed bargaining mech-
anisms [Bayo-Moriones, Galdón-Sánchez, 
Martinez-de-Morentin, 2016; Ingram, Wads-
worth, Brown, 1999]. However, we do not 
limit the study only to manufacturing enter-
prises; so included in the sample are organi-
zations operating in mining, construction, 
trade, finance, and business services. 
Participation in labour unions and the use 
of tariff wage schemes reflect the institu-
tional framework of the labour market. In 
this paper we refer to tariff schemes as an 
institutional system which differentiates and 
regulates wages for particular groups of em-
ployees depending on the intensity and dif-
ficulty of the work performed, and the level 
of qualification of the employee. Although 
tariff schemes may reduce the costs of wage 
setting for enterprises, they increase the 
rigidity of wage adjustments reducing pos-
sibilities for swift reactions to external shocks. 
Tariff schemes are mostly used by the enter-
prises with a Soviet legacy and are mainly 
concentrated in manufacturing. In recently 
established enterprises, tariff schemes are 
rarely favoured over more sophisticated HR 
grade systems which allow for more flexibil-
ity. Only 11% of the enterprises in the sample 
have any employees participating in labour 
unions, and 43% of the sample use tariff 
schemes, with 24% taking them into consid-
eration during the wage determination pro-
cess. Union participation is mostly concen-
trated in mining (18.1%) and manufacturing 
(19.5%), in large and relatively large enter-
prises (42.5% for firms with more than 1000 
employees and 23.4% for firms 251–1000 
employees, respectively).
2.2. Wage adjustment policies
Two questions in the survey are of particular 
interest for our study. The first, “Does your 
firm revise the level of the base wage?”, has 
four possible answers. Three of them mean 
that wage adjustments take place with some 
frequency: “Yes, wages are changed for eve-
ryone annually”; “Yes, wages are changed for 
everyone occasionally”; and “Yes, wages are 
changed for some workers occasionally”. One 
answer, “No, wages are not revised”, means 
that there is no observed specific pattern in 
wage adjustment, and such adjustments have 
not been performed recently. In order to pro-
vide clear, significant results, we merged the 
choices, leaving only two for further analysis: 
“Yes, wages are revised” (answers 1–3) and 
“No, wages are not revised” (answer 4). We 
do not know for sure whether the presence of 
revision necessarily refers to wage increases. 
However, due to the downward nominal wage 
rigidity discussed in the literature review we 
assume that the revisions of base pay mostly 
result in increases.
The second question is “What are the rea-
sons for base pay revisions in your enter-
prise?”. Only those firms which gave an af-
firmative answer to the first were asked the 
second question, as it explores the pattern of 
wage change in more depth. There are 7 pos-
sible reasons for wage revisions covered in 
the question. Following [Blanchflower, Oswald, 
1988],  we consider the answer “Due to the 
improvement of the firm’s financial situation” 
to represent internal factors, while the an-
swers “Due to inflation”, “Due to changes in 
the regional average wage”, “Due to changes 
in the average wage of close competitors”, 
“Due to changes in the national average wage”, 
223Wage adjustment practices in Russian firms
РЖМ 18 (2): 217–234 (2020)
Table 1
Descriptive statistics on wage adjustment, % of firms
variable Do not adjust wages Adjust wages
Firm size:
    Average 38.2 61.8
    < 50 45.6 54.4
    50–100 34.3 65.7
    101–250 30.9 69.1
    251–1000 29.5 70.5
    > 1000 22.2 77.8
Industry:
    Mining 42.8 57.2
    Manufacturing 33.2 66.8
    Construction 41.4 58.7
    Trade 39.6 60.4
    Transport and communication 28.2 71.8
    Finance 42.6 57.4
    Services 46.1 53.9
Financial position:
    Good 37.5 62.5
    Satisfactory 36.9 63.1
    Bad 49.8 50.2
Union:
    No    
39.4 60.6
    Yes 25.8 74.2
Labor costs in overall costs 35.8 33.9
Investment:
    No 43.6 56.4
    Yes 29.0 71.0
Innovation:
    No 43.7 56.3
    Yes 28.5 71.5
Tariff wage schemes usage:
    Yes 33.6 66.4
    No, but considered 34.7 65.3
    No 45.1 54.9
Real average wage:
    < 20 000 41.9 58.1
    20 000–24 999 35.5 64.5
    25 000–35 000 41.1 58.9
    > 35 000 24.7 75.3
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variable Do not adjust wages Adjust wages
Ownership:
    State-owned 35.4 64.6
    Foreign-owned 25.9 74.1
“Due to changes in collective agreements with 
unions”, and “Due to the increase of the na-
tional minimum wage” are external factors 
for wage adjustment. Respondents could select 
more than one reason. On average, 61.8% of 
firms employ wage adjustments. The larger 
the enterprise, the higher the proportion 
employing wage adjustments, with 77.8% of 
large firms (more than 1000 employees) mak-
ing changes compared to 54.4% of small firms 
(less than 50 employees). The transport and 
communications sector has the largest pro-
portion of companies changing wages (71.8%). 
In contrast, in the Services sector the small-
est proportion of firms do so (53.9%). There 
is no significant difference between firms 
with different financial situations. Table 1 
provides more detailed data on the distribu-
tion of firms in the sample concerning their 
wage adjustment policy.
2.3. Methodology
The first aim of this analysis is to distinguish 
what characteristics motivate firms to employ 
wage adjustments. For this purpose, we use 
a binary outcome model (probit regression), 
where the dependent variable is “1” if the 
enterprise changes the wage for any type of 
employees, and “0” otherwise. We do not 
focus on the timing of wage adjustments, 
although previous research indicates the ex-
istence of a schedule in a number of countries 
(see e.g.: [Amirault, Fenton, Laflèche, 2013]).
The determinants for each enterprise in-
cludes several subgroups. The first subgroup 
is a set of variables which reflect the struc-
tural features of the enterprise, including 
size, ownership, financial position (good, 
satisfactory or bad; self-estimated), innova-
tion implementation, investment, price com-
petition (which reflects the dependence of 
the firm’s prices on the prices of its close 
competitors), staff turnover, net growth of 
the number of employees, real average wage 
level in the company, and share of labour 
costs in overall costs. Innovation and invest-
ment are considered for the previous year, 
partly reflecting the overall financial per-
formance of the enterprise. Employee turn-
over is calculated as the sum of hire and fire 
ratios (including both layoffs and voluntary 
resignations), while employee net growth is 
the difference between the number of hires 
and fires. 
The second subset of variables includes 
two institutional factors: union participa-
tion and the usage of a tariff pay system. 
We expect that these dual factors will have 
a positive effect on the probability of wage 
adjustments of any kind. Previous research 
found a positive effect of centralized col-
lective bargaining on wage levels [Plasman, 
Rusinek, Rycx, 2007] and on wage adjust-
ments [Bayo-Moriones, Galdón-Sánchez, 
Martinez-de-Morentin, 2016].
The regression also contains control var-
iables for the year of observation, the indus-
try of activity, and the region where the en-
terprise is located, which is especially impor-
tant considering the significant regional 
differentiation in Russia. The control vari-
able for a real wage increase compared to the 
previous year, which is referred to in the rest 
of the paper as “wage growth”, is included in 
several specifications as well. 
Table 1 (end)
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The second aim is to reveal the main 
reasons behind wage changes, depending 
on the enterprise characteristics discussed 
above. For this purpose, we run probit re-
gressions for each of the seven reasons giv-
en for wage change that were featured in 
the survey (inflation, change of regional 
average wage, change of competitors’ aver-
age wage, change of the national average 
wage, improvement of the company’s finan-
cial situation, change in collective agree-
ments, increase of the minimum wage) with 
the same set of variables as in the first 
regression. This allows us to examine the 
relevance of firm characteristics for par-
ticular wage adjustment practices. 
We recognize a possible selection bias if 
the second set of “reason” regressions is run 
only on the subsample of enterprises who 
revised wages during the previous year. In 
order to deal with this problem, we consider 
the firms which have not introduced wage 
adjustments in the recent past as ones which 
do not recognize any of the proposed reasons 
significant enough to perform revisions. 
Hence, when running the set of “reason” 
regressions we also include these firms in 
the sample by assigning them 0 in place of 
the dependent variable instead of being miss-
ing. However, the results from the whole 
sample, presented in the next section, do not 
differ substantially from the results obtained 
in the sub-sample of firms which adjusted 
wages last year, which means that the con-
cern with selection bias was excessive.
In this analysis we use robust standard 
errors which are heteroscedasticity-consist-
ent. Though we recognize the possibility of 
the reversed causality problem, in this par-
ticular research we do not focus on it. However, 
reversed causality could be detected when 
including the wage growth variable into the 
analysis as wage growth can either be the 
result or the cause of wage revisions. For 
this reason, we run two separate probit mod-
els to recognize the determinants of wage 




This section examines the effects of internal 
and external factors on a firm’s decision to 
adjust wages. The findings of the regression 
analysis are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2
Determinants of wage adjustments: Marginal effects
variable Model with wage growth
Model without wage 
growth
Number of employees (RC: 30–50):
















Financial position (RC: satisfactory):
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variable Model with wage growth
Model without wage 
growth
























Real average wage (RC: < 20 000):
































Tariff wage schemes usage (RC: No):











Pseudo R2 0.194 0.179
N 2 266 2 299
N o t e:  “RC” indicates a reference category; *, **, *** — statistically significant at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively; robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2 (end)
227Wage adjustment practices in Russian firms
РЖМ 18 (2): 217–234 (2020)
We start off with employer characteristics. 
We find that the size of the enterprise mat-
ters as the probability of wage adjustment 
increases with the growth of the number of 
employees. The same result was found in 
[Bayo-Moriones, Galdón-Sánchez, Martinez-
de-Morentin, 2016] for Spanish manufactur-
ing enterprises. The explanation here is linked 
to trade union activity. First, large firms are 
more likely to have employees participating 
in trade unions. Hence, they obtain more 
bargaining power in wage setting. Second, 
large enterprises are usually more common 
for industries where trade unions have a 
long-standing history, i.e. mining and man-
ufacture. Our expectations concerning the 
importance of trade unions are also confirmed 
which will be described more in detail below. 
In contrast, the relationship with the 
financial position, which could be assumed 
to be linear based on previous studies 
[Commander, Dhar, Yemtsov, 1996], here 
appears to be statistically insignificant. 
The same conclusion applies to innovation 
activities undertaken during the previous 
year. However, investment activity, which 
also describes the firm from the point of 
view of its financial well-being, shows 
statistically significant results, meaning 
that being invested in during the previous 
year leads to a higher probability of pay 
revisions during the current year. This 
finding partially confirms our expectations. 
Investment activity is usually present in 
prosperous enterprises, where expected 
profits will lead to investor benefits. All 
in all, large profits and a good financial 
condition does not imply wage adjustments, 
contrary to the ideas expressed in [Amirault, 
Fenton, Laflèche, 2013]. Companies with 
higher real average wages are also more 
likely to participate in wage adjustment 
processes. These findings show that wage 
adjustment policies are mostly relevant for 
successful enterprises with high average 
wages. In fact, upward wage adjustment 
for successful firms might be an element 
of corporate policy aimed at increasing 
worker morale [Bewley, 1999]. 
Regarding other structural characteristics, 
foreign-owned firms operating in Russia are 
more likely to participate in wage adjustments. 
The coefficient for state owned firms is, in 
contrast, statistically insignificant which is 
in line with [Forth, Millward, 2000] who 
found no significant difference between private 
and public sector adjustments for Britain. 
Higher employee turnover also correlates to 
a higher probability of wage adjustment. This 
finding could be attributed to the necessity 
of attracting new employees. 
Concerning the share of labour costs, those 
enterprises which depend heavily on labour 
and spend the majority of income on wages 
and other labour related costs are more like-
ly to adjust wages as their overall financial 
success depends on it. However, our results 
suggest the opposite trend in Russia. An 
increasing fraction of labour costs in terms 
of the overall costs leads to a decline in the 
probability of wage adjustment by 0.2%. This 
estimate is statistically significant.
Regarding market conditions, we find that 
participation in trade unions is positively re-
lated to the probability of wage adjustment, 
which is unexpected considering the literature 
dedicated to Russian labour market specifics. 
Despite the insignificance of unions in wage-
setting and the lack of independence described 
in literature [Gimpelson, Kapelushnikov, 2013], 
institutional factors appear to correlate posi-
tively with the probability of wage adjust-ment. 
Surprisingly, union influence is insig-nificant 
in the Spanish framework, where a major role 
in wage adjustments is attributed to collective 
agreements. Spain has a centralized bargaining 
system with multilevel bargaining. Bargaining 
coverage is higher than trade union member-
ship with approximately 98% of establishments 
in manufacturing being covered by collective 
agreements [Bayo-Moriones, Galdón-Sánchez, 
Martinez-de-Morentin, 2016].
3.2. Reasons for wage adjustment
We turn now to the regression analysis that 
deals with particular causes of wage revisions. 
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Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for both 
adjustment reasons as a fraction of the over-
all sample and those of firms which adjusted 
wages at some point in the last year. According 
to the table, inflation and an improvement in 
the financial situation are the main drivers 
for wage adjustment. The importance of infla-
tion was also found for Spanish and British 
manufacturing which was the prevailing fac-
tor despite the decentralization of the bargain-
ing regime in Britain [Bayo-Moriones, Galdón-
Sánchez, Martinez-de-Morentin, 2016; Ingram, 
Wadsworth, Brown, 1999]. Unlike in Spain, 
changes in collective agreements appear to be 
the least important external factor. In Russia 
this could be due to lower union coverage, and 
the degree of centralization which is higher 
in Spain. In the more decentralized framework 
of Britain [Forth, Millward, 2000] union rep-
resentatives were often involved when positive 
wage adjustments were implemented.
Next, we consider the results regarding 
employer characteristics and market conditions. 
Table 4 reports the coefficients from the set 
of “reason” probit regressions. Small and 
medium enterprises appear to pay less atten-
tion to inflation compared to enterprises with 
250–1000 employees. This could be due to the 
transaction costs associated with wage adjust-
ments in larger establishments. By adjusting 
wages to the national cost of living, the em-
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for adjustment reasons
Factor
Share of the overall 
sample
Share of those who 
adjusted wages last 
year
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Inflation 0.27 0.01 0.35 0.48
Changes in the average regional wage 0.18 0.01 0.24 0.42
Changes in the average competitors’ wage 0.09 0.00 0.11 0.31
Changes in the average national wage 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.29
Financial condition improvement 0.23 0.01 0.30 0.46
Changes in collective agreements 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.14
The increase of national minimum wage 0.14 0.01 0.18 0.38
ployer tries to minimize those costs. The same 
result is obtained for Spain [Bayo-Moriones, 
Galdón-Sánchez, Martinez-de-Morentin, 
2016]. Inflation is also a driver closely re-
lated to comparability [Forth, Millward, 2000]. 
Changes in the average regional wage, the 
average national wage and the average com-
petitors’ wage reflect the importance of com-
parability for wage adjustment decisions. 
Previous research also indicates that managers 
are focused on external wage relativities as 
higher competitor wages are supposed to low-
er the effort of workers [Agell, Bennmarker, 
2007]. Regarding the size of the enterprise, the 
importance of regional wages increases linear-
ly while there is no such effect concerning 
competitors’ wages or the national wage. Good 
financial results appear to be an especially 
important driver for medium-sized enterprises 
(with 101–250 employees) and large ones (with 
over 1000 employees).
As far as the firm’s profitability is concerned, 
employers who estimate their financial condi-
tion as bad are less likely to adjust wages due 
to inflation or regional wages. Investment 
and innovation activities, which are related 
to the firm’s performance, provide statisti-
cally significant results as far as regional 
and competitor wages are concerned, mean-
ing that higher investment activity is posi-
tively related to the comparability consid-
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Table 4
Determinants of wage adjustments due to internal and external drivers: Marginal effects
variable
















    51–100 0.042* 0.051** 0.003 0.004 0.052** 0.014 0.043**
    101–250 0.034 0.071*** 0.015 0.018 0.091*** 0.002 0.008
    251–1000 0.086*** 0.081*** 0.032 0.027 0.067** 0.001 –0.019
    > 1000 0.066 0.130*** 0.062 0.034 0.109** 0.034 0.028
Bad financial 
position (RC: No)
–0.117*** –0.065** 0.037 –0.033 –0.011 0.005 –0.023
Investment (RC: 
No)
0.027 0.036* 0.028* 0.020 0.017 –0.002 –0.008
Innovation (RC: 
No)
0.035 –0.000 –0.001 –0.014 0.006 0.001 0.019
State owned firm 
(RC: No)
0.020 –0.043 –0.116*** –0.043 –0.066 0.015 –0.002
Foreign-owned 
firm (RC: No)




    20 000–24 999 0.072** –0.014 0.035* –0.023 0.052* –0.007 –0.031
    25 000–35 000 –0.007 –0.068*** 0.038** –0.020 0.101*** –0.014 –0.046**
    > 35 000 0.132*** 0.002 0.072*** –0.020 0.105*** –0.013 –0.066***
Worker turnover –0.077** 0.118*** 0.068*** –0.020 0.013 0.011 0.032
Worker net 
growth
–0.232*** 0.012 0.091 0.019 –0.022 0.027 –0.001
Labour costs in 
overall costs
–0,000 –0.001 –0,001 –0.001* –0.001* –0,000 –0.001*
Price competition 
(RC: No)
–0.000 –0.007 0.039** –0.014 0.040* –0.014* –0.042***
Union (RC: No) 0.006 –0.043 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.065** 0.044*** 0.022
Tariff wage 
schemes (No):
    Yes 0.108*** 0.091*** 0.018 0.038*** –0.048** –0.001 0.047***
    No, but 
considered
0.051** 0.064*** 0.054*** 0.029** –0.046** –0.018* 0.004
Wage growth 0.394*** 0.091 0.029 0.152*** 0.234*** 0.059* 0.129**
Year + + + + + + +
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Industry + + + + + + +
Region + + + + + + +
Pseudo R2 0.117 0.115 0.143 0.130 0.110 0.350 0.106
N 2 268 2 268 2 141 2 229 2 268 1 581 2 262
N o t e: “RC” indicates a reference category; *, **, *** — statistically significant at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 
levels, respectively; † — the variable was dropped due to lack of observations.
Table 4 (end)
erations in wage adjustment decisions. With 
respect to the average wage, high wage em-
ployers are more likely to react to inflation, 
competitors and an improvement in their 
financial position, but regional and nation-
al comparability does not affect them. Finally, 
the minimum wage adjustment, as expect-
ed, is not relevant for high-wage firms and 
high-wage employees as the increase in 
average wages leads to a reduction in the 
wage adjustment probability.
Foreign firms give less importance to re-
gional and national wages. As mentioned in 
the literature review, foreign owned firms 
emphasize internal factors rather than ex-
ternal due to their multiple institutional 
frameworks and the market conditions they 
operate in. State ownership decreases the 
probability of adjustment to changes in com-
petitors’ wages.
The last employer characteristic included 
in the analysis is employee turnover. It re-
flects the fact that enterprises need to recruit 
and retain labour, which is one of the factors 
for pay revisions discussed in the literature 
[Ingram, Wadsworth, Brown, 1999; Bayo-
Moriones, Galdón-Sánchez, Martinez-de-
Morentin, 2016]. Our results indicate that 
increasing worker turnover means there is a 
higher probability of wage adjustment due 
to comparability with regional and competi-
tors’ wages. As competitors usually have 
similar characteristics, they establish a de-
mand for similar types of workers. By adjust-
ing wages, a firm tries to avoid any future 
difficulties with recruitment. Comparability 
reflects a standard that an employer may 
choose to follow. Although turnover was not 
considered a structural employer character-
istic in previous research, the percentage of 
workers with a degree was a variable in-
cluded in the research for that purpose [Bayo-
Moriones, Galdón-Sánchez, Martinez-de-
Morentin, 2016]. Inflation indexation, on the 
other hand, is more common among firms 
with lower turnover and a lower net growth 
of employees, which suggests that these firms 
are more focused on their current staff. 
Finally, we analyse institutional factors 
which cause firms to react to external chang-
es. Trade union activity predictably results 
in a higher probability of wage adjustment 
due to changes in collective agreements, but 
more importantly, it leads to the expanded 
role of comparability as a driver for revision. 
In contrast, industry, local and national 
comparisons in Britain became more influen-
tial after deregulation [Ingram, Wadsworth, 
Brown, 1999]. Similarly, in Spain the results 
indicate that unions protect insiders more 
than outsiders, which means less attention 
is paid to attracting employees, diminishing 
the importance of comparability. Regarding 
inflation, unions do not play an important 
role as there is no binding collective agreement 
for inflation adjustment in Russia. In countries 
with centralized bargaining, the cost of living 
appears to be of major importance [Bayo-
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Moriones, Galdón-Sánchez, Martinez-de-
Morentin, 2016]. 
Another institutional factor, tariff schemes, 
is the only variable which is statistically 
significant for almost all drivers of wage 
adjustment. Adjustments for inflation, 
comparability and minimum wage are likely 
to occur if pay schemes are applied, while the 
improvement of the financial performance is 
the only internal driver showing the opposite 
pattern. In general, our results point to 
significant influence both from internal 
and external factors which are difficult to 
disentangle. 
4. CoNCLUSIoN
This study used data on Russian firms from 
2015 to 2017 to investigate the determinants 
of wage adjustment decisions. We included 
seven internal and external drivers for pay 
revisions into the analysis to find out how 
employer characteristics and institutions 
influence wage adjustments. Inflation, 
changes in the average regional wage, chang-
es in the average competitors’ wage, chang-
es in the average national wage, improvement 
in the financial situation, changes in collec-
tive agreements with unions and an increase 
of the national minimum wage were the 
factors considered in this research. We 
grouped the explanatory variables into two 
subsets: the structural features of the firms 
and institutional circumstances. Our anal-
ysis included sixteen independent variables, 
yet only a few were significant for wage 
adjust-ment decisions. 
Regarding the first set of variables, size, 
investment and employee turnover were pos-
itively related with the probability of wage 
adjustments. In contrast, the financial situ-
ation or innovation activity do not tend to 
be statistically significant under any condi-
tions. Ownership appeared to be significant 
when it comes to foreign-owned firms. In 
respect to the second set of variables, we 
found that union participation affects the 
weight attributed to particular wage adjust-
ment drivers. Our results indicate that the 
presence of a trade union ensures that com-
parability plays a more notable role in wage 
adjustment. 
Overall, our results suggest that revisions 
of base pay are most common for successful 
enterprises which offer higher wages and 
hire more employees. Wage adjustment is a 
mechanism for those who have the ability to 
pay. The institutional framework expressed 
in trade union participation and tariff pay 
schemes, though significant, leaves Russian 
firms room to manoeuvre as employers review 
and adjust base pay despite the flexibility 
introduced by variable pay in the Russian 
labour market. 
This paper adds to the existing literature 
in several ways. First, it considers the Russian 
market which in comparison to Europe re-
mains understudied in terms of enterprise 
wage policies. Second, it takes into consid-
eration employer characteristics to describe 
wage setting policies. In this paper based on 
Russian data, we have shown that pay reviews 
have a number of features that reflect im-
portant facets of employer behaviour in the 
labour market. 
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Практики пересмотра зарплат в российских компаниях
К. В. Рожкова, С. Ю. Рощин, С. А. Солнцев
Факультет экономических наук, Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая 
школа экономики», Россия
Пересмотр зарплат является важным механизмом кадровой политики в сфере вознаграждения, 
с помощью которого компании реагируют на рыночные изменения. В то время как значитель-
ное число исследований посвящено причинам различий в зарплатах индивидов, политика 
компаний в сфере пересмотра зарплат остается сравнительно малоизученной темой.  В работе 
анализируются детерминанты пересмотра зарплат на данных о 1500 российских предприятиях 
частного и государственного сектора за 2015–2017 гг. Для определения внутренних и внешних 
факторов этого процесса в исследовании используются пробит-регрессии. Результаты соотно-
сятся с выводами исследований по теме, демонстрируя, что и внутренние характеристики 
компании, и внешние условия рынка отражаются на вероятности зарплатных пересмотров. 
Пересмотры чаще производят успешные фирмы с высоким оборотом кадров, тем самым демон-
стрируя свои финансовые возможности. Вопреки расхожему мнению о бессилии профсоюзов в 
России, их действия направлены на принятие предприятием решения о пересмотре зарплат 
сотрудников. Данная статья является первым исследованием, посвященным детерминантам 
зарплатных практик в зависимости от характеристик фирмы, реализованным на российских 
данных.
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